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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
ELDON E. RASMUSSEN,
Plaintiff and

Respondent,
I Case No.
f
8081

— vs. —
U N I T E D S T A T E S S T E E L COMPANY,
Defendant and Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF

This reply brief is filed that the questions to be here
determined may be clarified and that misleading statements and confusing arguments may be eliminated from
the Court's consideration.
It is contended by respondent that the implied in
fact contract upon which he relies was formed on August
3, 1948, based upon prior custom and publications. (Resp.
Brief p. 14) It is appellant's position that there were no
publications or prior custom upon which respondent justifiably could rely to support his contention.
1
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I.
There were no publications prior to August 3, 1948* or
prior to respondent's termination^ upon which respondent
could justifiably rely to establish his alleged implied in fact
contract.
A. Prior to August 3, 1948 there were no company
or corporation publications pertaining to a job evaluation
program for non-exempt salaried employees of Geneva
Steel Company.
*" Q3! M a y 7, 1947, a Wage Rate Inequity Agreement was negotiated between Geneva Steel Company and
the United Steel Workers of America, CIO, representing
hourly production, and maintenance employees within
the Geneva plantsite providing for a job evaluation program for production and maintenance -jobsjmly. This
I agreement was the first of its kind at Geneva Steel Com/ pany and had no application to or connection with salaried positions of any kind at Geneva Steel Company.
2. The joint announcement of June 25, 1948 (Plaintiff's Exhibit 5) referred only to the program as it applied to the above-mentioned wage rate inequities agreement and there is no reference or indication, express or
implied, of the extension or application of any kind of
program for non-exempt salaried workers of Geneva
Steel Company. It should be noted that at that time the
CIO Steel Workers Union had no connection whatsoever with any clerical or salaried employees at Geneva
Steel Company and therefore any such statement involv2
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ing the Steel Workers Union would not be applicable
to such salaried employees.
B. The letter of August 3, 1948, was not intended
to, did not and could not apply to, or be understood as
applying to respondent and could not be the basis upon
which to establish an implied in fact contract.
It is now contended by respondent that the implied
in fact contract upon which he relies was formed on
August 3, 1948. (Resp. Brief p. 14) The further statement is made that the Witness Nelson and respondent
saw and "understood the announcement as applying to
them." (Resp. Brief p. 11)
What they may have seen or understood is, of course,
of no consequence unless appellant was, in some way,
responsible for having created that understanding or allowed* it to exist. (1) The letter referred to (Ex. P-3) was
directed to Plant Department Heads, not to any nonexempt personnel in or out of the General Offices. Moreover, it specifically states that the department head was
to notify employees in his department by personal contact and that the information which followed was for his
use in making said personal contact. (2) The fact is
that neither the Witness Nelson nor respondent testified
that he even saw the letter, much less that he understood
it applied to him. Mr. Nelson stated:
" I don't remember having seen this letter."
(R. 128)
and the respondent:
3
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"Q. I will show you what is marked Plain tiff's
Exhibit 3 and ask you if you remember seeing
that bulletin?
A. I saw something that gave that information.
Q. You don't remember whether this is the
identical one you saw which contained that
information, is that right?
A. That is right." (E. 160)
Counsel cannot be serious in his contention that an
employee in the General Office could believe that the
letter applied to him. Even if it be conceded that "all
salaried employees" and "members of plant personnel"
are two distinct groups as counsel atoues, the fact remains that all employees referred to vMre given a $17.00
a month increase. The reference to a salary inequities
program is that such a program will be undertaken with
respect to "said non-exempt salaried positions." "Said"
positions could be none other than those next above described, i.e., those who received a $17.00 raise. Respondent received, not a similar or comparable raise, but one
of more than 150% of that increase, to wit, $26.0Q a
month. (R, 51)
*^'
Respondent's increase was the 10% referred to in
the first paragraph of the notice; he could with equal
propriety claim to be included among that group, "Exempt Salaried Personnel," as to which there never has
been a job evaluation program or any retroactive salary
adjustments.
4
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C There was no publication subsequent to August
8,1948 of any kind by Geneva Steel Company referring
to the general office salary evaluation program untU
after respondent had terminated his employment
with
Geneva Steel Company.
1. The United States Steel News article dated July,
1#50 (Plaintiff's Exhibit 14) refers to an agreement executed between the CIO Steel Workers Union and certain
subsidiary companies of United States Steel Corporation.
It was a salary inequities agreement negotiated between
those companies and the Steel Workers Union and had
application only to the salaried employees in the companies represented by the United Steel Workers of
America, CIO. Geneva Steel Company was not a party
to any of those agreements and therefore they could not
bind Geneva Steel Company in any way either by application or by implication. Moreover, these agreements applied only to salaried workers represented by the union
and had on application whatsoever to salaried employees
in the General Offices of any of the companies involved.
2. Salary Inequities Agreement — Geneva Steel
Company and United Steel Workers of America, CIO,
dated July 27,1950:
(a) This agreement applied only to salaried employees represented by the CIO Steel Workers Union.
There is no reference or indication that this agreement
was to have any application to salaried employees not
represented by the Union.
(b) This agreement by its terms established the
retroactive date for union-represented salaried employ^
5
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ees at May 1, 1950. (See December 1,1950 Notice (Plaintiff's E x h i b i t s ) which has not been disputed by respondent.
(1) It is inconceivable that the company and the
union would agree in writing to a May 1, 1950 retroactivity date if all of these salaried employees had a vested right by means of a prior implied in fact contract to
retroactivity benefits back to March 9,1947, as contended
by respondent.
(2) The December 1, 1950 Notice (Plaintiff's Exhibit 5) indicates very clearly that the company in its s&le
discretion had extended this date of retroactivity to
March 9, 1947 for all non-exempt salaried employees
within the bargaining unit. This announcement changing
the date of retroactivity from May 1, 1950 which was
agreed upon in the collective bargaining agreement between the company and the union to March 9? 1947, clearly indicates that any determination of retroactivity date
was within the sole discretion of the company as late as
December 1, 1950 which date was subsequent to respondent's termination of employment with the company.

II.
It was appellant's intent to exclude from a retroactive
salary adjustment any non-exempt salaried employee in the
General Office who had quit prior to the establishment of
the Standard Salary Scale.
6
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We had understood respondent's contention to be
that the alleged implied contract to make a retroactive
adjustment in respondent's compensation arose from previous statements, acts or conduct and not because of,
but even in spite of appellant's intention.

However, on page 16 of his brief respondent states:

"It was Respondent's contention therefore
that the Company did not intend to prohibit former employees from receiving their retroactive
pay."

The evidence relied on refutes the contention.

1. The policy manual of the Delaware corporation
(Ex. P-13) expressly excluded "an individual who quit
or was discharged" from any consideration in respect
to a retroactive wage adjustment. That policy was the
guide and standard used at the Geneva operations until
June of 1951. (R. 99) The language above quoted was
deleted in the policy manual issued June 1, 1951 (Ex. P12) and the words "as determined by the Salary Administration Committee" substituted therefor. The reasons
for the change were fully explained by the Witnesses
Friedley and Heald. (R. 107, 153-4) The best evidence
of appellant's intent is its actual conduct and the fact
is not disputed that no one who quit prior to the formulation of the program was given any retroactive adjustment in his compensation. (R. 106)
7
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2. The news release of March 26, 1951 (Ex. P-7)
is at best a new spaper reporter's statement and is clearly
hearsay. The statement evidences no intent other than
one to make similar payments in the future to "similar
workers" in the general or headquarters office. There
is not the remotest suggestion or hint that individuals
who quit would be paid retroactive compensation. The
suggestion is indeed to the contrary; a worker is one who
is working, not one who had quit and had done so with
adequate warning as to what effect his action might have.
(R.107)
3. The announcements of December 15, 1950 (Ex.
P-15, P-16) expressly state the requirement that one must
be on the payroll on the effective date of the new salary
scale in order to receive retroactive compensation. And
these documents are the first announcement of any kind
made by appellant after it had been definitely determined
to adopt such a program for the General Office at the
Geneva operations.

4. The letter to Mr. Lawrence Lyman dated April
2,1951 (Ex. P-8) reads in p a r t :
"Included in this equity study is a retroactive
payment back to March 9, 1947, where due, to
those on the payroll at the time the program is
installed, and retroactive payments to those on
lay-off status at that time."
Further comment is unnecessary — the intent is clear.
(See also statement by respondent's witness T. Nelson,
8
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who said that he knew in February, 1951 that employees
must be on the payroll in order to receive retroactive
pay. (B. 130) ).

5. Respondent's reliance on Exhibit P - l l (Resp.
Brief, p. 17) is not readily understood. The exhibit wTas
prepared after this suit had been commenced (R. 159)
and for the sole purpose of answering respondent's Interrogatory No. 8. (Answer No. 6, R. 51, 61). The computation sought by respondent was simply to determine what
payments would have been made to respondent for the
retroactive period March 9, 1947 to his termination, had
he been fully qualified for any payments. It should be
no surprise that such a computation could be made.

III.
There was no custom with respect to general salary increases or otherwise which could be used as a basis for an
implied in fact contract relating to a salary inequity program and the details of eligibility for retroactive benefits.
Respondent has relied upon an alleged "custom" as
the basis upon which his implied in fact rests. (Resp.
Brief p. 14) The court below instructed the jury that
they could take into consideration "the establishment of a
custom that the plaintiff would be treated in the same
manner as some other employees who had received or
were about to receive retroactive reclassification pay."
(Inst. 11, R. 202, emphasis ours.)
9
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In its instruction No. 12, the court stated:
"If you find that there was an established
business custom known by both of the parties
hereto, you are instructed that the terms of such
custom shall constitute p a r t of the agreement, if
any, between the parties since it will be assumed
that each of the parties hereto contracted having
in mind such custom."
It is elementary that a custom which is permitted
to control the rights of the parties in the manner stated
by the trial court must comply with all the requirements
of an established business custom. None of such requirements are present in this case.
A. The alleged custom is by respondent's own evidence limited to the subject of general pay increases, and
the custom, if any, relative thereto cannot control the
rights of the parties with respect to a salary inequity
or job evaluation program. The subjects are distinct,
separate and unrelated. (R. 60, 97,126,136).
R. The evidence does not support the existence of
any custom at Geneva Steel Company prior to respondent's termination of employment.
Respondent has alleged a custom as to general salary increases. The following evidence was presented to
support the allegations:
Witness T. Nelson: ". . . I t was customary"
that when "the hourly people would receive a
blanket increase, some time following that, may10
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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be two or three weeks, the general office personnel would receive an increase somewhat similar to it." (Emphasis ours) (R. 126)
Respondent stated that he he received two general
increases during his employment and answered that
the general practice as he understood it was,
". . . the salaried employees were treated
very similar to the hourly or union employees,
they were paid a similar amount very shortly
thereafter." (R. 136)
F. Ray Friedley:
;

". . . So far as the dates are concerned that
is correct, so far as the rates of pay or general
increases are concerned, they would differ of
course." (R. 97) and "well, general increases being
related usually to cost of living increase, the treatment would be similar."

J.D.Dillon: (R. 60)
"Q. Were general pay increases granted union
employees and non-unions employees at or
near the same time?
A. Yes.
Q. Were those pay increases, although not actually the same, were they comparable and corresponding anywhere near to the pay increases granted to union employees?" (Emphasis ours).
11
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In addition, the facts, not in controversy, show that
there were two general increases granted during respondent's employment at Geneva kSteel Company:
(1)

April 1, 1947.
Union employees—12-^c per hour.
Non-union salaried employees—$22.00 per
month.

(2)

July 16, 1948.
Union Employees—9-i/£>c per hour.
Exempt employees—10%.
Non-exempt salaried employees:
(a) Inside the plant—$17.00 per month.
(b) General offices—10%
(c) Respondent received 10% or $26.00 per
month.

Further testimony by J. O. Dillon: (R. 80)
"There was no obligation on the part of the
company to follow any particular line;"
and upon further questioning:
"Actually there was no practice, no procedure
on the part of the company which required them
to follow both through, or with any group that
was not subject to a contract such as we had with
the steelworkers." (R. 80)
and on recross (R. 81), Mr. Dillon explained the loose
use of the word "policies" and also the procedure used
by management in evaluating general increase situations
for employees not represented by a union.
12
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It is our position that such evidence does not satisfy
the requirements of an established custom. Those requirements as set forth in 25 C.J.S. 78, Customs and
Usages, Section 2, are as follows:
"Stated concisely and generally, a usage or
trade custom must be ancient, certain and uniform, compulsory, consistent, general, continued,
notorious, reasonable, not in contravention of law
and acquiesced in."
With respect to antiquity, the record shows that the
custom claimed by respondent allegedly arose by virtue
of two general salary increases within a two year period,
which salary increases, by respondent's own admission,
were not the same as the general wage increases negotiated with the union. It is submitted that the test of antiquity is not met by evidence of such a nature.
The requirement of certainty and uniformity is fundamental to the existence of any established business
custom.
In Sickelco v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., I l l F. 2d
746, the court held:
"We think that the general doctrine is well
put in 17 C. J. 451, Custom and Usages, §10; 'A
usage or custom of trade must be certain and uniform in order to be binding. It is not sufficient
that it is merely as certain as the nature of the
business to which it applies will permit. Further,
a loose and variable practice will not be allowed
to control the rights of the parties, nor will an
alleged usage which leaves some material element
to the discretion of the individual.'
13
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"And in the same volume of Corpus Juris,
453, Customs and Usages, Sec. 11, 'A custom must
be compulsory, and not left to each one's option
to obey it. Likewise, a usage, in order to be regarded as entering into a contract, must be clearly
distinguished from mere acts of courtesy or accommodation.' "
In Nelson v. Southern Pacific Co., 15 Utah 325, the
Utah Supreme Court stated as follows:
"To establish the validity of a custom of
trade, the usage must have existed such a length
of time as to become generally known, and must
be shown to be reasonable, uniform, certain, and
not contrary to law.
" . . . it is apparent that the court's definition
is erroneous, because, as will be observed, it violated one of the essential elements necessary to
the existence of a custom or usage of trade, which
is that it is certain . . . A custom does not depend
upon whether the business in which it is claimed
will permit its existence. The question is, does it
actually exist? Is it established as a fact? In
addition to being certain, the custom or usage must
be uniform, reasonable and not contrary to law.
There are no comparative degrees as to the certainty of a custom. It is either certain or it is
not, and the charge of the court in qualifying this
element is erroneous, . . ."

See also:
Securitv Commercial & Savings Bank v.
Southern, etc. Bank, 74 Cal. App. 734, 241
P. 945;
14
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Etna Forge and Bolt Co. v. Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co., 282 F. 786;
Young v. One Hundred and Forty Thousand
Hard Brick, 78 F. 149;
Bowling v. Harrison, 6 How. (U.S.) 248, 12
L. ed. 425.
Kespondent's evidence fails completely to satisfy
this requirement. The facts with respect to general salary increases show, and respondent readily admits, that
the increases were not the same. He relies, however, upon a general practice of making "comparable" or "similar" or "anywhere near the same" general increases to
support his allegations of an established business custom.
Such a contention is untenable. Two general salary increases which were neither certain nor uniform in their
application cannot satisfy the certainty requirements
necessary for the existence of an established business
custom.
A custom must also be compulsory and must not be
left to each one's option to obey it, and a usage must
clearly be distinguishable from mere acts of courtesy
or accommodation. 25 C.J.S. Customs and Usage, Section
5. See, also, Sickelco v. Union Pacific Eailroad Co., supra.
The record shows and the fact is that the company was
not required or obligated in the granting of general increases to employees not represented by a Union and that
Geneva Steel Company in its discretion, determined the
nature and amount of all pay increases, general or otherwise, with respect to such employees. (E. 81). Surely a
15
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desire on the part of the company to treat its non-union
employees in an equitable manner on occasions of two
genera] increases cannot give rise to a binding custom
which requires identical treatment for all employees,
Union and non-union, in the future. Appellant submits
that the evidence nowhere supports the existence of
such a custom at Geneva Steel Company.
The requirement of consistency is not satisfied by
the undisputed facts. How can two general salary increases which differed from each other and from the general wage increases negotiated with the Union meet this
test of consistency?
It should be apparent from the above that there was
no custom of any kind at Geneva Steel Company upon
which respondent justifiably could rely to establish his
alleged implied in fact contract.

CONCLUSION
The far-reaching effect of a decision herein adverse
to appellant cannot be over-estimated. Should the decision below be allowed to stand no reason is apparent why
appellant would not be required to grant non-union employees every benefit negotiated by the unions. And the
same rule would be applied to any employer who had
made the slightest effort to treat all his employees in an
equitable manner. We believe it may be safely assumed
that the labor organizations would be among the first to
object. The unions would be deprived of much of the
16
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strength behind their organizing drives if it could be said
that all benefits they may secure would as a matter of law
be granted to all non-union employees.
And if, in the past two unions representing employees of the same employer had accepted similar contracts, would this court require in all future dealings that
each union accept without further ado what the other had
negotiated? We believe the answer is obvious.
It is respectfully submitted that the court below
erred in denying appellant's motion for a directed verdict
and in denying appellant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The judgment should be reversed.
C. C. PAKSONS,
A. D. MOFFAT,
CALVIN A. BEHLE,
Attorneys for Defendant and
Appellant
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